considered part of the Indian Ocean Region. This exclusion is intentional, and serves to limit analysis to developments originating in ASEAN based processes. This is not to say that NTS issues have not catalysed security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, as they most assuredly have, particularly in the realm of maritime security (Cordner, 2010; Paul, 2011; Akaha, 2002) , only that discussions of this topic are beyond the scope of this paper.
Given its geographical location as the 'pivot point' between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, ASEAN has been at the centre of coordinative efforts in Indo-Pacific security coordination. ASEAN is a logical choice for an evaluation of new regionalisms emerging in the Indo-Pacific because 'Southeast Asia is a crossroads and maritime space between South, Central, East Asia, Australia and the Pacific, and it also straddles the overlapping interests of India and China' (Lin and Grundy-Warr, 2012, p. 56) .
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a growing trend of security integration across the Indo-Pacific, centred on ASEAN, and characterised by a 'staggering growth in regional multilateralism' (Tow & Taylor, 2009) . States are gradually altering their strategic considerations to accommodate a host of previously suppressed, unrecognised, or emerging sources of insecurity. For many states in Asia, the greatest threats to stability are not military incursions but instead stem from economic, political, social or environmental factors. These threats, collectively labelled 'non-traditional security,' encompass an ever growing range of international problems (environmental degradation, irregular migration, pandemic diseases, financial instability, transnational crime, etc.).
NTS issues have steadily gained political salience since the 1990s and have provided a unique and undeniable incentive for regional actors to move towards substantive security cooperation. Foremost, they are often trans-boundary in nature and necessitate governance at the regional level. Furthermore, NTS issues also offer politically neutral options (e.g., disaster relief and humanitarian intervention) that are ideal for testing cooperative opportunities. The influence of NTS issues is apparent in both the orientation and structure of new modes of security cooperation and discourse appearing in the Indo-Pacific.
This article does not argue that NTS issues are replacing traditional military-based matters as the focus of regional security. Instead, it argues that NTS problems have offered both compelling incentives and clear opportunities for states in the region to change their approachs to security governance, and trial new methods of cooperation.
Potentially, collaboration and coordiation fostered by NTS issues can become crucial stepping stones for developing new forms of region-wide security cooperation.
This article proceeds in three discrete, but interconnected sections. First, it examines how the transnational nature of NTS issues has fostered cooperation across the IndoPacific Region. It builds upon the work of scholars in both the constructivist and institutionalist schools that have focused on the changing conceptualisations of security in Asia, and the impacts of these changes on regional security structures. The 'ungovernable' nature of NTS problems at domestic levels has compelled states to open up multi-lateral dialogues on a host of security issues (Devare, 2006; CaballeroAnthony, 2010b CaballeroAnthony, , 2010c Acharya 2009 ). Dialogues have, in turn, evolved into an active push by some regional actors to consolidate and strengthen security architectures directed at NTS issues (Ball, 2010; Haacke, 2009) . The configuration and tone of these dialogues differ dramatically from previous forms of security cooperation. Regional dialogues have gradually begun to deviate from the traditional governing norms of consensus, non-confrontation, and process-driven approaches and have instead have adopted more outcome-oriented and assertive paths to security governance.
The article continues by interrogating the institutional developments stemming from state adaptation to NTS issues. Using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a starting point, it argues that NTS issues played an important part in the establishment of the Forum by highlighting the need for multi-lateral security (Katsumata, 2003 (Katsumata, , 2006 . NTS issues have continued to drive the Forum towards stronger, and more tangible, forms of cooperation. At the centre of this re-invigoration is the newly established ASEAN Regional Forum Defence Officials' Dialogue (ARF-DOD), which focuses mainly on NTS issues. Using defence-based processes, the ARF has taken firm strides toward concrete security cooperation on the issues of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).
Turning from the ARF, the article's focus shifts to ASEAN, which has sought to govern trans-national security issues by establishing the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM). The ADMM, and its Indo-Pacific extension the ADMM-Plus, were both ostensibly initiated to address NTS issues, and have been key actors in broadening security cooperation across the Indo-Pacific.
Last, this article briefly examines how ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries have bolstered multi-lateral processes with a series of bi-lateral NTS agreements. Often pre-dating multilateral efforts, NTS issues have served as a starting point from which stronger security cooperation has stemmed. The bi-lateral relationships ASEAN has with India and China will be examined and presented as evidence.
In a region historically hesitant to embrace institutionalised security architectures, the appearance of NTS issues has obligated states to cooperate on security matters. The nature of these issues has influenced the development and configuration of new modes of security cooperation in the region. Furthermore, they have afforded the region the opportunity and incentives to test its capacity for substantive security coordination and to pursue new levels of Indo-Pacific security integration.
The Evolution of Strategic Security in Asia
The transition from traditional to non-traditional understandings of security is problematic for realist approaches to international relations. Traditional conceptualisations of security reinforce realists' understandings of global order by holding the state as the central referent object and provider of security. Threats are seen as largely stemming from the "use of force or threat of the use of force by another state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of a state" (Akaha, 2002, p. 1) . From this perspective, states are the highest authority in international relations especially in regards to security; however, non-traditional security issues challenge this state-centric paradigm.
First, NTS issues forcefully broaden the narrow 'realist' view of security to include more 'liberalist' understandings of security; liberal approaches to international relations argue that security is not only composed of military threats but also threats from other sources and towards actors other than the state (Akaha, 2002) . NTS issues are overwhelmingly 'non-military in nature' (Caballero-Anthony, 2010b, p. 202 ) and stem from issues not usually associated with security. Ewing and Anthony note that '[c]ontemporary trends and events in the environmental, food, energy, health, development and other sectors … have propelled these issue areas up the policy strata of many states," (2012, p. 8) . For the majority of Asian states, 'non-military threats to regime survival are more likely to materialize than traditional military threats' (Arase, issues' (2010c, p. 2) . This re-evaluation of security through the lens of 'nontraditional' security has forced a 'deep-seated historical transformation in the scale of the state's institutions and activities' (Hameiri & Jones, 2011a, p. 2) as states seek to 'govern' beyond their traditional territorial borders.
Further complicating NTS governance is the region's adherence to the ASEAN-way of diplomacy, which prioritises the sovereignty of the state. This approach to governance, which is based on non-confrontation, non-interference, and progressing at a pace acceptable to all, has proven itself to be inherently incompatible with effective NTS governance. The consensus-based and process driven methods of the ASEAN-way are unsuitable for managing NTS issues that often emerge suddenly and demand immediate action. NTS issues have caused Southeast Asian policy makers to 'to re-think existing modalities for addressing these threats, which has ostensibly lead to the (re)shaping of the institutional architecure in Soutehast Asia' (CaballeroAnthony, 2010c, p. 2). States and regional observers alike have noted that 'new frameworks for cooperation to deal with [NTS issues] effectively are urgently needed' (Watanabe & Sahashi, 2001, p. 2) , and a few regional actors have gone so far as to discuss the possibility, and even necessity, of a 'post-ASEAN' foreign policy (Sukma as quoted in Tan, 2012, p. 29) . Cognisant that NTS issues are only going to increase in severity, states across the Indo-Pacific have begun to move, albeit slowly, away from the ASEAN-way and adopt new frameworks of security cooperation.
While NTS issues have undermined ASEAN-way based governing models, they have encouraged new governing prospects. NTS issues present both the incentive and the opportunity for enhanced regional integration, and for a variety of reasons they are the ideal candidates for building confidence in cooperative security governance. As Tow and Taylor rightly note, regional institutions have recognised this potential and 'ASEAN countries have tended to base their architectural-building efforts around socalled non-traditional security issues ' (2009, p. 9 ).
There are two characteristics that make NTS issues suitable focal points for regional cooperation. First, the trans-boundary nature of NTS issues offers a unique opportunity for states to find a commonality of purpose. States across the Indo-Pacific are exceptionally diverse in language, culture, systems of government, and levels of development. Yet, Sekhon observes that '[a]s a result of the emergence of nontraditional security concerns, there are common interests among these nations that impel them to deal with the new challenges hereby leading to more cooperation rather than competition ' (2007, p. 43) . Devare notes that the 'growing convergence between ASEAN and India in perceptions and mutual interests, both in traditional as well as non-traditional areas of security ' (2006, p. 4) has encouraged India 'to develop cooperative security with ASEAN,' (Devare, 2006, p. 4) . In a like manner, Arase points out that '[s]hared vulnerability explains why China and ASEAN are drawn to NTS cooperation' (Arase, 2010, p. 810) . NTS issues are powerful enticements for states across the region to coordinate their efforts towards achieving regional stability. Second, '[n]on-traditional security issues are easier to address than hard-core strategic and defence issues' (Ball, 2012, p. 22) . Often (though not always) NTS issues lack political baggage and are therefore less likely to 'raise the same level of sensitivity that more traditional security issues are apt to generate' (Tow & Taylor, 2009, p. 9) .
NTS issues are an opportunity to foster cooperation because 'addressing nontraditional security issues, pandemic threats and environmental issues is not only important in itself, but also crucial to nurturing trust and promoting community building in East Asia' (NEAT as cited in Tow and Taylor 2009, p. 10) .
Unsurprisingly, what progress has been made in regional security cooperation in Asia has been on the politically popular and non-contested NTS issues of Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, which provide low-risks and high-outcome opportunities to acclimatise state actors to substantive security cooperation. Both the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit have identified disaster relief as 'an area of cooperation to enhance capacity and as a confidence building measure' (ASEAN Secretariat News, 2011b).
The mutual vulnerability to NTS issues has served to link states across the Indian and Pacific Oceans and has been intrinsic to the 'development of new multilayered governance arrangements, which bring in a range of new actors and governance instruments' (Hameiri & Jones, 2011a, p. 3) . Because of NTS issues, states have renewed efforts at region-wide security cooperation, deepened and broadened existing institutions, and established new mechanisms of security cooperation that heralded 'a new era for unprecedented levels of interstate cooperation'(Caballero-Anthony, 2010a, p. 322).
New Modes of Security Cooperation
Coordinative efforts by states have begun to coalesce into an NTS-based governing regime characterised by broader security definitions and an emphasis on cooperative and collective understandings of security (for information on regimes see Krasner 1982, p. 185) . The majority of new security institutions reflect this new regime, and have characteristics that are markedly different from those of older institutions.
Foremost, their agendas are noticeably geared towards NTS issues at the expense of traditional security topics; furthermore, they have paired this focus with an assertive push for practical security cooperation. In a notable departure from previous processes favouring conflict avoidance and non-interference, all of the institutions discussed below demonstrate a greater willingness to have the uncomfortable conversations required to address sensitive security problems, and are regularly praised for allowing 'for a more frank and free flowing exchange of views' (ARF, 2002) .
Non-traditional Security and the ASEAN Regional Forum
The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993 signalled the start of NTS initiated cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The ARF was developed to address the 'new security challenges in the wider Asia-Pacific region following the end of the Cold War' (Khong & Nesadurai, 2007, p. 33) . It was also a successful bid by ASEAN to draw important regional actors into cooperative security frameworks. Over time the ARF has grown to encompass the majority of the states in the Indo-Pacific. NTS issues have always been an important part of the ARF and have increasingly come under the Forum's jurisdiction (Haacke, 2009 ). In the last decade, the ARF agenda has ballooned with activities devoted to NTS cooperation; between August 2013 and December 2014 approximately half of the meetings/workshops on the ARF agenda were devoted to NTS-type problems (e.g., transnational crime, environmental degradation, cyber security, disaster relief) (ARF, 2014). More significantly, NTS issues are one of the few areas where the ARF has successfully achieved practical security cooperation. In particular, maritime security (disaster relief), humanitarian assistance, transnational crime, and terrorism have been valuable starting points for cooperation. Each of these issues has its own ongoing Inter-sessional Support Group (ISGs) or an Inter-sessional Meeting (ISM) and form a prominent part of the ARF's agenda (Khong & Nesadurai, 2007) . ARF participants are aware of the coordinative opportunities offered by NTS issues and have discussed 'whether practical cooperation in relation to NTS issues could be a step to moving unambiguously from confidence building to preventive diplomacy' (Haacke, 2009, p. 443 NTS issues are driving the ARF to reorient and re-organise itself to more effectively cope with NTS issues. The Forum's Vision 2020 commits to the development of 'preventive diplomacy in priority areas the directly affect our peoples and that are insurmountable through our individual actions alone, namely those pertaining to nontraditional, trans-boundary and inter-state security challenges' (ASEAN, 2009 ). This reorganisation has led to the development of a 'defence track' within the forum. The ARF has increasingly sought to include defence officials, and what first began as an informal luncheon in early 1997 eventually evolved into the ASEAN Regional Forum-Defence Officials' Dialogue (ARF DOD). ARF DOD meetings are held several times a year, with four such meetings held in 2010 and three in 2011. The topics of discussion vary and include managing and responding to natural disasters, strengthening defence diplomacy within the ARF, enhancing regional cooperation on maritime security and peacekeeping operations, using military resources to adapt to climate change, piracy and terrorism (Ball, 2012) . While the topics differ, the theme remains the same, with the ARF DOD meetings geared towards trans-boundary and mostly non-military threats to stability, in other words, on NTS governance.
Defence officials have been reliably supportive of substantive security cooperation (Haacke, 2009 ) and they have used NTS issues as leverage to successfully argue for greater regional coordination. In the opening remarks of the ARF DOD in 2012 the Director General of the Cambodian General Department on Policy and Foreign Affairs referenced the 'unpredictability driven by strategic competition with increasing non-traditional security challenges' and re-emphasised that '[n]on traditional security issues are no doubt the common key issues requiring joint efforts and cooperation' (Sowath, 2012) Table 1 provides a list of practical security measure on NTS issues that have taken place in the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ADMM processes.
[ Table 1 This practical approach to security cooperation has garnered the attention and praise of important regional players. Shortly after the ADMM's first meeting, the thenUnited States Defence Secretary Robert Gates noted the differences between the ADMM-Plus process and other regional governing mechanisms.
One of the critical challenges of the Asian security environment has long been the lack of strong mechanisms for cooperation between nations in the region … last year the US was the first non-ASEAN nation to accept the invitation to join the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) forum … I am optimistic that it will be a key body for making progress on a number of issues of shared interest including maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations (Gates, 2011) .
Secretary Gates' comments support the ADMM-Plus's more assertive governance approaches over the methods used by previous processes, and his high expectations appear to have been well founded. After the second ADMM-Plus meeting in 2013, his successor, Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel, applauded the ADMM-Plus for being 'action-oriented' and noted that, as a group, the 'ADMM-Plus is setting the right example with coordinated approaches to transnational and non-traditional threats' (Hagel cited in Pellerin, 2013) . Perhaps realising the potential of new defence-based forums to fill the 'security governing gap' in Asia, the frequency of the ADMM-Plus, which was originally only scheduled tri-annually, has been increased to bi-annually starting in 2013 (ADMM, 2012) with discussion now turned toward the potential of an annual meeting (Ball, 2012) .
ASEAN -Bi-lateral Expansions to the Indo-Pacific
While this paper has focused largely on broad multi-lateral processes, it is important to turn a little attention to smaller sub-regional agreements on NTS issues. ASEAN has used the mutual vulnerability of NTS issues to engage its two most powerful Indo-Pacific 'neighbours' in bi-lateral forms of cooperation (bi-lateral meaning ASEAN-China and ASEAN-India). These sub-regional processes often predate the more recent developments in regional security cooperation, such as the ADMM and ADMM-Plus, and the involved countries have shifted the mutual trust evolving from these relationships onto the larger multilateral groupings. The success of bi-lateral agreements demonstrate how NTS problems can spur security cooperation on a smaller scale, and then be used to cultivate more comprehensive levels of cooperation at a later date. India and China are two important examples, despite being portrayed as regional competitors both countries have active agreements with ASEAN, and have also become important partners in multi-lateral forums like the ASEAN+3, ASEAN+10, ARF and the ADMM. The following section touches only briefly on the depth of cooperation existing between ASEAN, India, and China, and is not meant to be a comprehensive list of their cooperation on NTS issues. Instead, it serves to demonstrate how NTS issues foster cooperation at multiple, and mutually reinforcing, levels of security cooperation.
ASEAN-India Non-Traditional Security Cooperation
During the Cold-War, connections between India and the rest of the Asia-Pacific were tenuous; however, the end of bi-polarity signalled an upswing in relations between India and ASEAN. Becoming an ASEAN Dialogue partner in 1992, India is now active in the ASEAN+1 processes, a member of the ARF, and a member of the ADMM-Plus. India also ascended to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the bedrock of ASEAN led diplomacy, in 2003 (Naidu, 2004; ASEAN-India, 2012 ).
The dearth of previous connections makes the recent developments between India and Southeast Asia all the more remarkable, particularly India's 'Look East' policy (Naidu, 2004) . Though this policy indicates India's renewed focus on its eastern neighbours and encompass the entirely of the Asia-Pacific (thus making it a truly Indo-Pacific endeavour), it is most clearly focused on Southeast Asia. India has actively engaged members of ASEAN (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore) along with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to combat NTS issues. Notably, it established the Bay of Bengal Navies in 1995 with the goal of dealing with trans-boundary problems like interoperability. It has also and focused on specific NTS problems like coordinating search and rescue missions and conducting seminars on cooperation concerning marine environmental protection, pollution control and disaster relief (Naidu, 2004) .
Between India and ASEAN 'mutual concerns are seen to be converging' (Devare, 2006, p. 18) and NTS issues have become effective catalysts for the development and strengthening of regional security structures. Maritime issues in particular have offered ample opportunity for both ASEAN and India to work together, as '[m]any so-called non-traditional security concerns, such as piracy, pollution from oil spills, safety of SOLCs, illegal fishing and exploitation of offshore resources, and other important elements of economic security, are essentially maritime' (Ball, 2012, p. 27) .
'India-Southeast Asia convergence can be a harbinger of partnerships across Asia' (Devare, 2006, p. 4) to stand solidly apart' (Arase, 2010, pp. 826-827) . In turn, this security coordination has helped further other avenues of cooperation, both between China and ASEAN as well as in the larger forums geared towards comprehensive security coordination. A very significant implication of this trend is that 'the institutionalization of defense cooperation is riding piggyback on the back of progress made in NTS cooperation' (Arase, p. 818) .
Conclusion
This paper has explored the influence of NTS on security cooperation in the IndoPacific. In particular, it has evaluated how NTS threats have functioned as important drivers for the expansion of existing institutions, and the development of new institutions aimed at providing security governance. It has highlighted the tension between realist traditions focusing on the state as the highest actor in international relations, and the realities of state interdependence regarding non-traditional security governance. By demonstrating the necessity of, and gradual shift towards, regional institutions as the providers of state security, this article undermines the realist assertions that the state is the highest actor in security. Instead it promotes an alternative perspective of regional security that expands both the sources of insecurity (NTS issues) as well as the reference objects of security. From this perspective, stronger regional institutions are key to ensuring the stability of both individual states and the region as a whole.
The trans-national and non-military nature of NTS issues has caused the region to reevaluate the feasibility of the ASEAN-way as its dominant government paradigm.
NTS issues require more than just rhetoric, and have driven the region to accept stronger and more assertive forms of cooperation. New forums have developed a reputation for forthright discussions on NTS issues and for being more tolerant of criticism. Additionally, ASEAN's emphasis of moving at a pace comfortable to all has fallen by the wayside as practical security exercise such as the DiREx can, and do, occur without the participation of all countries.
The transnational nature of NTS issues offers the necessary incentive for countries in the region to recognise their common interests and undertake substantive steps towards meaningful security cooperation. This has manifested in the development of the ARF, the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus, as well as a host of individual bi-lateral arrangements between ASEAN and countries across the Indo-Pacific, each providing an additional layer in a nested hierarchy of governing structures. ARF, 2014; Ball 2012; AMSCIP, n.d.) 
